> Minutes of the last Fed’s meeting (Nov. 20) and of the last ECB’s meeting (Nov.21) The Fed’s minutes will reveal the discussions on the drop of the Fed’s benchmark rate but the most useful part will be on the commitment to stop, at least temporarily, the downside trend on the benchmark rate. In the ECB minutes, the focus will be on the discussions related to the important disagreements between governing council members after September decisions
>Markit flash estimates for November in the Euro Area, Japan and the US (Nov.22) In October a rebound in the US for the manufacturing sector was a surprise reflecting mainly the spike in the New export Orders index. The divergence with the eurozone and Japan was astonishing. The November survey will highlight the possibility for the US to remain strong while Japan and the EA are still weak.
>The French Climat des Affaires for November (Nov. 21) The French index has been above its historical average for months. This is consistent with the stronger momentum of the French growth when compared with the Euro Area. This is linked to the specificity of the French economic policy that feed domestic demand in order to cushion a possible external shock. This strategy limits the possibility of a downturn.
>Eurozone Current Account for September (Nov.19) The Euro Area current account shows a large surplus. It is circa 3% of GDP. This means that there is an excess saving in the Euro Area and that we have means to invest in order to improve the autonomy of our growth process. Because accumulating surplus is just useless.
> Existing homes sales in the US for October (Nov. 21) and Housing Starts (Nov.19) Existing home sales indicator is a measure of a wealth effect on consumption expenditures. Its recent profile suggests a slowdown in expenditures during the last quarter of this year before a mild rebound at the beginning of 2020.
>Productivity in the third quarter for the United Kingdom (Nov. 20) The strong slowdown in the UK productivity suggests an extended period of low growth except if investment rebounds strongly. This will not be the case whatever the Brexit agreement because Brexit will continue to provide large uncertainty.
> The Phylli Fed index will be release on November the 21st. The Japanese trade balance on November the 20th, the Japanese CPI for October on November the 22nd and the German Consumer Confidence index on November the 21st
Employment increased in the euro area during the first quarter (+ 1.4% annualized). The pace of job creations is solid. However, since the beginning of 2018, productivity has lost momentum and it doesn’t improve. GDP is not growing fast enough in the face of rising employment. The risk is that an external shock from, for example, global trade will penalize activity with after that a quick adjustment on employment. The economy does not create leeway (no productivity gains) that may cushion negative shocks. That’s worrisome.
The Macro 2 pager explains how the interest rates profile will remain low for an extended time. The central banks’ stimulus after the 2008 crisis has been caught up by an economy whose characteristics have changed and which can now accommodate only low rates thus conditioning the behavior of central banks.
John van Reenen, a professor of economics at the Massachusets Institute of Technology, said if the UK could not boost productivity growth, wages would not increase, tax receipts would not rise and austerity would continue. “Not very nice,” he added.
As long ago as 1984, in his Paths to Paradise, André Gorz, a self-proclaimed “revolutionary-reformist” stated, baldly, that the “micro-economic revolution heralds the abolition of work”. He even argued that “waged work . . . may cease to be a central preoccupation by the end of the century”. His timing was wrong. But serious analysts think he was directionally right. So what might a world of intelligent machines mean for humanity? Will human beings become as economically irrelevant as horses? If so, what will happen to our individual self-worth and the organisation of our societies?
Developed countries’ economies were enjoying robust growth in the first half of 2008, despite some initial cracks that had been appearing since the previous summer. That was ten years ago, and since then, world economic dynamics have transformed completely, as the sources of momentum and adjustment systems have changed, especially in developed countries.
We could potentially identify a whole raft of differences but I have focused on six that I feel are useful in helping us understand the new world economic order.
1 – World trade is no longer growing at the same pace
World trade has entirely changed pace since the crisis in 2008. Before that date, it fluctuated fairly broadly around a trend estimated at 6.8% per year in volume terms, thereby creating a strong source of momentum in each economy and driving economic growth, with an overall virtuous dynamic between trade and economic activity.
But since 2011, world trade has seen little fluctuation and the trend is now at 2.3%. The turning point in 2011 can be attributed to austerity policies and in particular programs implemented in Europe. So momentum that can be expected across the rest of the world is no longer on a par with past showings. This change is significant for Europe as the continent used to wait for the rest of the world to pick up a pace before staging its own improvement, and this explains the systematic time lag in the cycle between the US, which traditionally recovered very sharply after a negative shock, and Europe, which always seemed to be lagging slightly. Continue reading →
This is my weekly column for Forbes.fr. The French version is available here
The new French president will have to deal with an economy that is growing at a spontaneous rate of close to 1%, which is the average figure observed since the start of 2013.The new leader’s challenge will be to break with this trend on a sustainable basis, in order to create enough jobs to cut back unemployment and generate additional revenues to finance the social welfare system more effectively and more comprehensively.
Each candidate is of course fairly optimistic on the projected growth profile, expecting the average figure to be slightly under 2% in 2021/2022: in the space of five years, the new president therefore thinks that he/she could almost double the French economy’s growth rate. This is highly ambitious.
Judging by the growth profiles expected by the various candidates, the financial crisis, which has been going on for almost 10 years, will only have had a temporary impact as the economy could converge towards its pre-crisis trend by the end of the president’s forthcoming five-year term. This analysis is mistaken: the French economy has been permanently marked by this crisis. Like most western economies, it has suffered severe and persistent shocks that hampered its growth momentum. The US, the UK and other countries are witnessing a similar situation. Sluggish growth is not an exclusively French phenomenon and other countries are also taking a long time to find a way to return to pre-crisis growth levels.
In view of French economic figures, candidates’ projections display considerable determination on their part, as the economy is not spontaneously converging towards 2%. Continue reading →